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ABSTRACT 
In December 1979, the 40th Russian Army crossed the Amu River in support of 
the pro-communist regime in Afghanistan, but after a decade of war and stabilization 
efforts, Afghanistan nose-dived into instability. Ultimately, the Soviet Union withdrew, 
leaving behind a country facing a civil war. In 2001, a U.S.-led coalition of more than 
40 countries entered Afghanistan and instated a liberal political regime as a stabilization 
measure. Yet, Afghanistan is still far from stability and peace. The thesis asks: How do 
the regime/state stabilization efforts of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led coalition in 
Afghanistan compare? Acknowledging that the efforts of the two great powers differ in 
magnitude and duration, as well as in their ideological impetus, this thesis offers a 
comparative case study of the regime/state stabilization efforts of both eras. Specifically, 
it compares the building of security forces, the development of institutions, 
and the development of the economy and infrastructure. Although prior research has 
examined particular aspects of the Soviet and U.S.-led stabilization efforts in isolation, 
few sources offer a comparative analysis from a comprehensive view. This thesis 
contributes to closing that gap. Furthermore, the answer to the research question has 
implications not only for the stability of Afghanistan but also the regions of Central and 
South Asia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We meet here during a crucial period in the history of our nation, and of 
the civilized world. Part of that history was written by others; the rest will 
be written by us.  
George W. Bush.1 
I had a very bad relationship with an officer in my platoon. I hated him so 
much that I told him ‘If I ever get out of the Army I’ll kill him.’ And he 
said, ‘Well, I am going to send you to a place from which you will never 
return.’ 
Afganets2 
In December 1979, a limited contingent of the 40th Russian Army crossed the 
river Amu and entered Afghanistan to support the pro-communist regime and 
sympathizers in the country.3 This invasion of Afghanistan, which took the world by 
surprise, continued as a bloody experience for a decade and finally ended in chaos both 
for the Soviet Union and for Afghanistan.  
More than a decade later, Afghanistan was invaded again, this time by the United 
States with a coalition of more than 40 countries. This later invasion was a byproduct of 
the tragic incidents of 9/11, in which 3000-plus innocent civilians were killed by 
terrorists with ties to Afghanistan, which had become a chaotic backwater and a safe 
haven for the terrorist groups since the Soviet’s defeat and withdrawal.4  
1 Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2006), 1.  
2 Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1995), 
34. 
3 Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, trans., The Afghan War: How a Super Power Fought and Lost 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 1. 
4 Miles Kahler, “State Building after Afghanistan and Iraq,” in The Dilemmas of State Building: 
Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, eds. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (New 
York: Routledge, 2009), 287.    
2 
During both periods of invasion of Afghanistan, exhaustive efforts were initiated 
to stabilize the regimes of the time: The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan during 
the Soviet invasion and the Northern Alliance (and coalition) in the post-9/11 phase. The 
stabilization efforts focused on the development of institutions like building 
Afghanistan’s security forces to include the Afghan National Army and the Afghan 
National Police (known as Sarandoy in the Soviet era),5 political development, economic 
and infrastructural development and above all pacification efforts and national 
reconciliation. The first effort by the Soviet Union met its Waterloo by 1989, while the 
second effort by the U.S.-led coalition is still far from victory, despite the vast 
expenditures of blood, treasure, and time.   
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes the regime-stabilization efforts of the Soviet Union and the 
U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan and asks: How do the regime-stabilization efforts of the 
Soviet Union and the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan compare?  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Afghanistan has been in turmoil for decades. The ouster of King Zahir Shah by 
Muhammad Daoud Khan6 in 1973 and the later invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union slid the country into a chaos that continues under the current president, Ashraf 
Ghani. The latest invasion of Afghanistan by a U.S.-led coalition of more than 40 
countries has almost reached a dead end, as little progress is being made toward an 
enduring peace. The Taliban-led insurgency is gaining momentum, and the influence and 
control of the Afghan government is not encouraging.   
                                                 
5 Antonio Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978–1992 (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 2000), 67.  
6 Rodrick Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89 (London: Profile Books Ltd, 
2011), 28–31. 
3 
The Soviet war effort focused primarily on strengthening the pro-communist 
government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA7), which had 
already lost its popularity among the masses. It was on the decline after unpopular 
policies8 and infighting between its Parcham and Khalq factions.9 The rebellion and 
revolt against the PDPA government had already started10 when the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, presumably to support the pro-communist 
government of President Nur Muhammad Taraki and reassert their control over Kabul.11 
The Soviets were also wary of the reputed inclination of Hafiz Ullah Amin toward the 
United States. The Soviet Union also looked at Hafiz Ullah Amin with suspicion because 
he had killed the strong pro-communist President Nur Muhammad Taraki and had taken 
over power in October 1979.12 By contrast, in case of the U.S.-led coalition, Afghanistan 
was invaded with an aim to track the 9/11 terrorists belonging to al-Qaeda who were 
using Afghanistan as a safe haven under the patronage of the Taliban regime. It was a 
reactive act and not a one-sided aggression like that of the Soviet invasion of 1979, 
although many question its viability and necessity.  
This thesis is undertaken to ascertain whether, on a comparable battleground, the 
stabilization strategies of the two rival superpowers are also identical. These findings 
might shed light on whether the outcome for Afghanistan and the region are likely to be 
the same. This thesis examines the experiences of both periods of Afghan history and 
                                                 
7 Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010). PDPA was established on January 1, 1965, as a political party at the time when King Zahir 
Shah was ruling Afghanistan. In 1967, it split into two factions named The Khalq (the people) and The 
Parcham (the flag). With time, both factions developed serious differences with each other based on the 
ethnic composition of both groups. In 1973, the party helped Prime Minister Muhammad Daoud Khan in 
overthrowing King Zahir Shah, who then took over as the president of the country. However, he developed 
friction with the PDPA and started firing its members from government offices. This antagonized the 
Soviets as the PDPA was more of a Marxist party and affiliated with the Soviet Union. The friction finally 
led to the Saur revolution in which PDPA seized power by toppling the government of Muhammad Daoud 
Khan and a takeover by Nur Muhammad Taraki as the president of Afghanistan. Later, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to protect the government of President Nur Muhammad Taraki from the 
suspected pro-American faction of PDPA led by Hafiz Ullah Amin.  
8 Giustozzi, 10–19. 
9 Braithwaite, 30–31. 
10 Braithwaite, 40–57. 
11 Braithwaite, 74. 
12 Braithwaite, 71–74. 
4 
focuses on similarities and differences to effectively draw pertinent lessons. The 
comparative analysis of both stabilization endeavors will assist in determining the future 
path of the current invasion of Afghanistan.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A large literature exists on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the response by 
the United States and its allies during the Cold-War era, the Soviet strategy and the U.S. 
counter-strategy, and the Mujahideen struggle against the Soviet and PDPA regime.13 
Similarly, literature is available on the post-9/11 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, covering 
the successes and failures in the War on Terror, the fall of the Taliban, the formation of 
the Karzai regime, the subsequent anti-Taliban regimes or Afghan political governments, 
and the stabilization efforts by the U.S.-led coalition of more than 40 countries. Although 
literature specific to stabilization efforts by the Soviet and the U.S.-led coalition in 
respective eras is available, much less literature exists, particularly specific to the Soviet 
stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. The literature of the Cold-War era mostly covers U.S. 
and allied counter-measures against the Soviet Union, famously branded “Afghan jihad” 
or “Charlie Wilson’s war.”14  
The literature on stabilization efforts in general is available and focuses on 
different aspects like regime stabilization, state stabilization, and nation building under 
the overall ambit of peacekeeping operations. Additionally, the comparative analysis of 
the stabilization efforts of the two eras (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979–1989 
and the current U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001–2014, i.e., until the 
election of President Ashraf Ghani) has seldom been conducted as a unified effort, 
although comparative analysis of some of the factors has been carried out in isolation.15 
                                                 
13 Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan: 1978–1992; Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The 
Russians in Afghanistan 1979–89; Mark Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union’s Last War (London: 
Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1995).  
14 George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War (New York: Grove Press, 2003) 
15 Comparison of efforts to build security forces in Afghanistan has been carried out by Olga Oliker in 
her book Building Afghanistan Security Forces in Wartime. The book was published in 2011 by RAND 
Corporation and focuses only on comparison of the development of security forces in the two eras and does 
not include other aspects pertaining to state or regime stabilization. 
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1. The Theoretical Context of Stabilization 
As a theoretical framework, stabilization efforts include regime stabilization, state 
stabilization, nation building, and aspects like Third World state building and Western 
state building.16 This area of study also includes domestic stabilization efforts and foreign 
directed/driven stabilization measures. These terminologies vary slightly in scope and 
definition but overlap each other considerably.  
Stability operations fall under the overall ambit of peacebuilding operations.17 
They include: 1) shaping the security environments for subsequent stability phases; 2) 
providing support to much needed governmental institutions; 3) building emergency 
infrastructure; and 4) and providing humanitarian assistance operations.18 In 1992, UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali categorized peace operations as peacekeeping, 
peace enforcement, and peacebuilding operations.19 The last category included stability 
operations like training of security personnel, monitoring elections, building or 
restructuring government institutions, and reconciling political factions. Many scholars, 
such as Francis Fukuyama, Simon Chesterman, James Fearon, David Laitin, Stephen 
Krasner, and Roland Paris, have argued in different ways that the aspect of building 
institutions for the transition from war to peace has been under emphasized in 
peacebuilding operations.20 Fukuyama criticized the international community for their 
failure to address the important aspect of institution building in their peacebuilding 
measures in countries like Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo.21 In the view of Simon 
Chesterman, this neglect in Bosnia and Kosovo resulted in the failure to transition from 
war to peace.22  
                                                 
16 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions 
of Postwar Peace Operations (New York: Routledge, 2009). 
17 Paris and Sisk, 5. 
18 Paul K. Davis, Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction 
(Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2011), xv. 
19 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace–A/47/277 S/24111–UN Documents: Gathering a 
Body of Global Agreements,” http://www.un-documents.net/a47.277.htm. 
20 Paris and Sisk, 8. 
21 Paris and Sisk, 8. 
22 Paris and Sisk, 9. 
6 
2. State Building: What It Is and What It Is Not 
“State building” refers to building or constructing government institutions after an 
initial peacebuilding drive in countries that emerge from conflicts.23 These conflicts may 
be internally or externally driven. Francis Fukuyama explains state building as “the 
creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing ones.”24 He 
argues that there is a lot of expertise about the transfer of resources across international 
borders but the actual state-building aspect comprises much more than that and is not 
well understood and executed by international actors.25 In Statebuilding: Governance and 
World Order in the 21st Century, Fukuyama cites the example of the AIDS epidemic in 
Africa and contends that the antiretroviral drugs (required for curing the epidemic) can be 
made available to these countries by the international community. Nevertheless, he refers 
to the availability of antiretroviral drug as just one part of the problem related to the 
matter of resources. The other more pressing requirement is the availability and 
formation of state institutions to administer AIDS recovery programs.26  
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk do not consider state building to be 
synonymous to peacebuilding; however, it can be referred to as a subcomponent of 
peacebuilding operations. They argue that peacebuilding is the creation of an 
environment in which violence is subdued greatly for the subsequent components of 
long-lasting peace.27 State building is fostered over the peace environments achieved in 
the initial phase and refers to constructing and strengthening governmental institutions.28  
Lakhdar Brahimi, an eminent and highly regarded former UN diplomat, considers 
state building a main objective of any peace operation in a country witnessing a 
                                                 
23 Paris and Sisk, 14. 
24 Francis Fukuyama, Statebuilding: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (New York: 
Cornel University Press, 2004), ix. 
25 Fukuyama, Statebuilding, ix. 
26 Fukuyama, x. 
27 Paris and Sisk, 14. 
28 Paris and Sisk, 14. 
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conflict.29 He illustrates a few key activities pertaining to state building as a main 
objective of the peace operation, including reintegration and national reconciliation, rule 
of law, and the electoral process.30 He argues that institution and system building is in 
fact state building that should be the focus of the international community while 
maintaining peace in a country.31 
According to UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, peace operations can 
be categorized as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding operations.32 The 
last category includes stability operations like training security personnel, monitoring 
elections, building or restructuring government institutions, and reconciling political 
groups. 
3. State Building vs. Nation Building 
State building differs from nation building in many aspects. State building mostly 
refers to the development of concrete foundations of institutions, whereas nation building 
relates to the fostering of a population’s national identity and cohesion.33  
The terminology of nation building is extensively used in the United States more 
than in other Western countries, which advocate state building over nation building.34 
Fukuyama argues in his book Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq that 
America’s reference to nation building is similar to state building and evolving political 
institutions and advocating and sponsoring economic development. He further explains 
nation building to be a larger phenomenon encompassing state building coupled with 
economic development. The other Western powers, however, object to the use of the 
nation building terminology as they contend that a nation building effort by an outside 
                                                 
29 Lakhdar Brahimi, “Statebuilding in Crisis and Post Conflict Countries,” 7th Global Forum on 
Reinventing Government: Building Trust in Government (June 2007) 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN026305.pdf 
30 Brahimi, 4. 
31 Brahimi, 5. 
32 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda for Peace–A/47/277 S/24111–UN Documents: Gathering a 
Body of Global Agreements,” http://www.un-documents.net/a47.277.htm. 
33 Paris and Sisk, 15. 
34 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 3. 
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force is not an attainable objective.35 They argue that nations evolve from inside, through 
an evolutionary process. 
Most scholars consider case studies of Japan and Germany after World War II as 
the model for successful nation building because both turned into stable and prosperous 
democracies. Fukuyama, however, argues that scholars misunderstood the political 
developments in these countries.36 He argues that the state institutions in these countries 
were very strong and even survived the influence of the outside powers. He considers the 
outside powers' contribution to the political development in these countries to be 
exaggerated out of proportion and believes that both countries had institutions that 
became weak due to war but never became nonexistent.37 
For Jochen Hippler, “nation building” is an old term that rose and fell in the 1950s 
and 1960s and finally vanished in the 1970s.38 He argues that the concept of nation 
building initially focused on the Westernization or modernization of Third World 
countries. He contends that “the term ‘nation-building’ is used today in a markedly vague 
and inconsistent manner.”39 In a way, he reaffirms Fukuyama’s views that the term 
“nation building” is loosely used by Americans for state building. 
The concept of nation building in the United States has been in discussion quite 
often. In another book about state and nation building, Fukuyama explains that for some 
conservatives nation building is a futile effort in international welfare.40 However, the 
concept gets full endorsement from international financial institutions that regard it as a 
viable proposition if appropriate resources are at the disposal of the outside powers.41 It is 
perceived that this endorsement comes as these institutions consider only the 
                                                 
35 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 3. 
36 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 4. 
37 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 4.  
38 Jochen Hippler, “Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-building–Terminology and 
Political Concepts,” in Nation-building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? (London: 
Pluto Press, 2005), 3–14. 
39 Hippler, 6. 
40 Fukuyama, State-Building, 99. 
41 Fukuyama, State-Building, 100. 
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reconstruction part of nation building, which is obviously easily achievable through these 
institutions.  
Reconstruction and development are considered to be two main components of 
nation building.42 For Fukuyama, reconstruction relates to the restoration of damaged 
countries and has been historically achieved by the outside powers.43 Japan, Germany, 
and Italy can be termed as reconstruction efforts by the United States that proved 
successful. On the other hand, the development part, which relates to the creation of new 
institutions and the undertaking of economic development,44 must be dealt with by the 
legitimate government of the country itself for long-lasting outcomes; although the 
implementation is very difficult, Afghanistan and Iraq under the U.S. and allied forces are 
relevant examples of development.45  
Fukuyama argues that the development part can be dealt with by the country 
itself, i.e., be domestically driven, if the institutions are still intact to some degree as with 
post-World War II Japan and Germany.46 Yet, in the case of failed states like Somalia 
and Afghanistan, the development phase of nation building could not be pursued by the 
countries themselves as these countries had witnessed widespread suffering over decades, 
and the state institutions had eroded to the point of being non-existent.47 
4. State Building or State Stabilization vs. Regime Stabilization 
Authors like Anton Minkov and Gregory Smolynec overlappingly use the 
terminology of regime stabilization with state building, apparently due to the Soviet 
efforts of investment in the regime of the PDPA. In their article “4-D Soviet Style: 
Defence, Development, Diplomacy and Disengagement in Afghanistan during the Soviet 
Period,” the authors examine “Soviet regime stabilization efforts … related to Soviet 
                                                 
42 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 4. 
43 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 5, 7. 
44 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 5. 
45 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 7. 
46 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 4. 
47 Fukuyama, Nation-Building, 4. 
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statebuilding and social and economic development efforts.”48  The authors use the term 
“regime stabilization” for state stabilization and do not differentiate between the two 
terms. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze how the current military and 
development campaign led by the United States and a coalition of more than 40 countries 
over 15 years compares with the Soviet Union’s campaign of Afghanistan from 1979 to 
1989. I hypothesize that the current regime/state stabilization efforts by the U.S.-led 
coalition are similar to the Soviet Union’s regime stabilization efforts, although they 
differ in magnitude and duration. The comparative analysis will explain why Afghanistan 
is still unstable despite a military and development campaign led by the United States and 
a coalition of more than 40 countries for more than 15 years. The military gains achieved 
up to 2003 are on the reverse as the Taliban, who were once defeated by 2003, are again 
the ruling majority of Afghanistan directly or through many warlords. The Taliban, 
instead of perishing in oblivion, still pose a serious threat to the Afghan government.   
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses a comparative case study approach comparing the current U.S.-
led War on Terror in Afghanistan with the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of 
Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. The thesis focuses only on the comparison of the 
regime/state stabilization efforts of both eras. The thesis examines the parallels and 
disconnects between the two efforts. The case studies of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-
led coalition were chosen because of many similarities ranging from the terrain, 
environment, and time period to the problem areas being faced by both countries. While 
comparing the outcomes of the two case studies, the thesis keeps in view the differences 
in the obtaining environments at the time of the invasions and the ideological differences 
in both invasions.  
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This thesis compares the two state and regime stabilization efforts in Afghanistan 
with a focus on the following four factors: 1) the building of security forces to include 
Army and Police, 2) political development, 3) institution development, and 4) economic 
and infrastructural development. 
For the purpose of research, this thesis uses a variety of sources including 
scholarly journals, openly available policy papers, books, and open publications of the 
Soviet Union and the U.S.-led coalition. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into four chapters. After the Introduction, Chapter II 
highlights the background of the Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan and examines the 
Soviet Union’s regime stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. Chapter III details the 
background of post-9/11 Afghanistan covering the time period up to 2014 (i.e., the 
election of President Ashraf Ghani) and examines the U.S.-led coalition force’s 
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II. SOVIET REGIME STABILIZATION EFFORTS 
IN AFGHANISTAN  
The Soviets made great efforts to stabilize the Afghan regime of the time during 
their decade-long stay in Afghanistan. The Soviet war aims in Afghanistan focused 
primarily on strengthening the pro-communist government of the PDPA, which had 
already lost its popularity among the masses. The Soviets’ regime stabilization in 
Afghanistan focused on building the Afghan security forces, including the Afghan 
National Army and the Ministry of Interior (MoI) Forces (known as “Sarandoy”49); 
political development, including pacification efforts and national reconciliation; and 
economic as well as infrastructural development. 
The present chapter discusses Soviet regime stabilization efforts in Afghanistan in 
detail. Specifically, it finds that the extensive Soviet efforts in Afghanistan failed badly in 
an asymmetrical conflict. There are several reasons for this ultimate failure. First, 
although investment in the Afghan military was considerable both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, the Soviets organized the Afghan military along the lines of the Red 
Army—for better and worse—to counter the threats faced by the pro-communist PDPA. 
The Soviets also believed in the importance of the MoI forces, including the Afghan 
Police (Sarandoy), the Border Guard, and militia forces in addition to the notorious 
Afghan intelligence agency—the KhAD. This emphasis on overlapping domestic security 
agencies reflected a tried-and-true Soviet model of internal pacification superimposed 
uneasily on the Afghan situation, as evidenced by both the staggering rate of desertion 
from these forces and the suspicions of infiltration by the very insurgents these agencies 
were established to defeat. Indeed, the Soviets invested heavily in the stabilization and 
strengthening of the PDPA and only the PDPA—rather than broadening the political base 
of Afghanistan by abolishing the one-party system and introducing political pluralism.   
The Soviet political efforts in Afghanistan meant bringing warring factions into 
the folds of the PDPA instead of recognizing them as a separate entity. This aspect 
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created serious hurdles for the Soviets and contributed greatly to their failure to pacify the 
mujahedin groups fighting both the Soviets and their political affiliates, the PDPA 
government. Tellingly, the Soviets tried national reconciliation in the beginning but could 
not pursue it vigorously as they were focused more on political development to maintain 
the one party system. The Soviets also invested in economic development and nation 
building projects in Afghanistan to pacify the resistance movement by the mujahedin but 
could not achieve the desired results through the development strategy. This chapter 
details Moscow’s ambitions for a “Sovietized” Afghanistan and provides the context for 
the frustration of these goals on the ground. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND—RUSSIAN INTERVENTION IN 
AFGHANISTAN 
The bloodless coup of July 1973, resulting in the removal of King Zahir Shah, 
ushered in a new era of instability that would be considerably bloodier. During the coup, 
the pro-communist Mohammad Daoud overthrew the Afghan monarchy, which had ruled 
the country since 1929.50 Mohammad Daoud had already enjoyed close ties with 
Russians during the 10 years of his premiership (from 1953 to 1963).51 Daoud had 
received Russian support on economic issues in addition to close cooperation on the 
dispute with Pakistan over Pashtunistan.52  
After the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy, Daoud took over as president rather 
than becoming the Shah like his predecessor had done.53 Daoud ruled with an iron hand 
and imposed serious repressions on the parties and the students, curtailing their 
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freedom.54 Daoud arrested several political leaders and even executed five, which were 
the first political executions in more than 40 years.55 Daoud also strengthened relations 
with the United States, the Shah of Iran, and the Saudis56, which caused serious issues 
with the Russians, who were not happy with Daoud’s leaning towards the West.57 The 
Russians turned to the PDPA, headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki with Babrak Karmal as 
a member.58 The PDPA staged a coup in April 1978 when Daoud’s government arrested 
many leaders of the PDPA including Hafizullah Amin. The leaders were arrested after the 
PDPA’s demonstrations following the killing of one of their leaders.59 In the ensuing 
coup by the PDPA, Daoud was killed in Kabul—along with his family members—by 
military officers who were loyal to the PDPA leadership.60 With the death of President 
Daoud, more than 200 years of Durrani Pashtuns’ rule in Afghanistan (since 1747) ended. 
Nur Mohammad Taraki took over as Prime Minister of Afghanistan and appointed 
Babrak Karmal and Hafizullah Amin as his Deputy Prime Ministers.61 The initial 
government consisted of both Khalq and Parcham factions.   
Taraki could not establish a strong government, and he relied heavily on the 
Soviet Union for maintaining control over the country. The reliance on the Soviets meant 
provision of the military and financial support by the Soviets to the weak Taraki 
regime.62 The government could not function smoothly and remained divided between 
the two factions of the PDPA. In July 1978, Taraki and Amin decided to get rid of 
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Babrak Karmal—a Parcham leader—and sent him to Czechoslovakia as an ambassador.63 
Subsequently, the PDPA government undertook a serious purge of the Parcham faction 
and killed thousands of their members and supporters. According to one estimate, at least 
20,000 people were killed.64 Ultimately, Babrak Karmal went into exile in Prague65 
rather than coming back to the country as ordered by Hafizullah Amin.66  
The government issued various decrees that proved highly unpopular among the 
peasant class, the clergy, and the landowners in addition to the Parcham faction, which 
was already provoked. The decrees issued by the government and the purges resulted in 
mass rebellion and the rise of anti-government forces, which were mostly Islamic parties. 
The insurgency took a momentous turn after the massacre of Herat in which the rebels 
attacked the city amid the significant presence of Soviet advisors. In the ensuing battle 
for control of Herat, the local army also revolted and fought alongside the rebels.67 
According to Collins, around 50 Soviet advisors were brutally killed by the insurgents 
through assassination squads specifically formed for the task.68 These squads searched 
for the Soviet advisors and beheaded those who were caught.69 
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During this turbulent period, Hafizullah Amin consolidated his position over the 
government after developing serious issues with Taraki. He finally took power on 
September 16, 1979 and killed Taraki later at his home.70 The murder of Taraki raised 
alarms in Moscow as Hafizullah Amin was suspected to be inclined toward the United 
States.71 Russia then opted to intervene in Afghanistan more openly. 
In December 1979, the Soviet 40th Army invaded Afghanistan in support of the 
communist party. Russian military units targeted various military and strategic centers, 
including various tank units, television and radio stations, the MoI, and the Presidential 
palace with a view to control the nerve center of the Kabul regime.72 Many Afghan 
members of the PDPA accompanied Russian units in their march toward strategic centers 
in Kabul. Hafiz Ullah Amin was killed, and Babrak Karmal was reinstated as the Soviets 
considered him more loyal.73  
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a surprise to many. The next decade 
witnessed an armed resistance by the Afghan freedom fighters—famously labeled 
mujahedin—against the Soviet Army and the puppet government of the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Nevertheless, this era of Afghan history also witnessed 
widespread Afghan suffering and mass casualties that were largely inflicted by the 
Soviets.   
The armed struggle by the mujahedin was supported financially and militarily by 
the United States and Saudi Arabia and was regulated through Pakistan. Various Afghan 
tribes were formed into many groups that were trained and armed by the United States 
and Pakistan, battling against the Soviets through jihadist and freedom-fighter mindsets. 
The struggle bore fruit in the shape of the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan 
in 1989 after a decade of bloody war. 
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B. SOVIET UNION’S REGIME STABILIZATION MEASURES IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
The Soviet stabilization strategy in Afghanistan revolved around the 
establishment of a strong communist party and its subsidiary organizations.74 The Soviets 
believed that the communist party in Afghanistan, the PDPA, would then control all state 
institutions, much as pro-Soviet communist parties proliferated in East-Central Europe 
after World War II.75 It was desired that the Red Army would work hand-in-glove with 
the Afghan Army to defuse the insurgency in the countryside followed by enforcement of 
a social reform agenda.76 The Soviet state-building strategy can be explained through 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Soviet State Building Strategy in Afghanistan77 
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The stabilization efforts focused on building Afghanistan’s security forces (on the 
Soviet model) to include the Afghan National Army and the Sarandoy, political 
development including pacification efforts and national reconciliation, and economic as 
well as infrastructural development.  
1. Building of the Security Forces 
The Soviets focused mainly on developing the Afghan security forces both under 
the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the MoI. An exhaustive effort was undertaken to 
improve the forces, including (in some cases even first-time raising of units, divisions, 
and corps) development, training, and provisioning of equipment. The Soviets were of 
the view that strong Afghan security forces would be able to relieve the Soviet 40th 
Army from Afghanistan by taking over the tasks of security and military duties.   
a. Development of the Forces Under the MoI 
The Sarandoy were mainly comprised of the local population, organized and 
raised to serve at pre-designated locations that were close to the homes of the rank and 
file. They were under the direct control of the central government and were organized in 
companies, battalions, and brigades. In 1979, the force was comprised of 8,500 
personnel. The Soviets had the goal of raising the manpower to 75,000, which was 
achieved by 1983. The strength later grew to approximately 100,000, although the 
ultimate goal of 115,000 personnel was never achieved.78 According to Antonio 
Giustozzi, the Soviets succeeded in raising the total manpower of the Sarandoy to 
155,000 by the year 1989 from a mere 8,000 at the end of the year 1979.79 According to 
Olga Oliker, the MoI numbers of personnel were as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. MOI Number of Personnel over Time80 
The Soviets relied heavily on the Sarandoy in the beginning. The Soviets desired 
a force under the MoI with the policing mission and combat potential to share the load of 
the military by conducting combat on a lower scale. In the beginning, the military was 
involved in policing duties as well, in addition to hard-core military operations. The 
policing duties, however, seemed to reduce considerably the combat readiness of the 
military. The Soviets were of the opinion that the Sarandoy could counter the rise in 
crime that was anticipated after the PDPA government took measures to strengthen their 
rule in the country.81 The Soviet advisors anticipated the need for strict measures to 
pacify the resistance by the Islamic parties. The Soviets believed that the strict measures 
would then deteriorate the law and order situation in the cities and would increase the 
role of Sarandoy to control the situation. Soviet expectations proved to be wrong; the 
situation grew more violent with every passing day and affected the Sarandoy, which saw 
massive desertions and the subsequent disbandment of units in the initial phases of the 
Soviet invasion.  
The Soviet Union thus focused both on the recruitment and training of the 
Sarandoy. The Soviets controlled the operations of the Sarandoy through the attachment 
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of approximately 5,000 Soviet advisors who were tasked to focus more on organizational 
functions and to build up the force to enable it to share the burden of the Soviet 
military.82  
The Sarandoy mainly focused on fighting the counterrevolutionary insurgents and 
even assisted the Soviet and Afghan armies in holding a particular area after military 
operations. Some of the responsibilities assigned to the Sarandoy were83:  
• Policing duties in areas of deployment with protection of key assets of 
importance.  
• Assisting the armed forces in hostage rescue operations. 
• Providing security for convoys on roads during the initial phases of Soviet 
invasion and consolidation. 
• Gathering intelligence for the Soviet military. 
Sarandoy training was conducted both inside Afghanistan and in the Soviet 
Union. From 1978 to 1986, around 12,000 Sarandoy officers were trained in institutions 
under the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD).84 Essential training for a limited 
number of Sarandoy junior commanders was also conducted in Tashkent each year by the 
Soviets.85 Inside Afghanistan, the training was conducted through various operations with 
the military or even independently. The advisors attached to the Sarandoy units played 
pivotal roles in training the Sarandoy during operations. The equipment provided by the 
Soviet Union included small arms, mortars, armored vehicles, and automobiles, which 
enhanced the efficiency of the Sarandoy to some extent.86 
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The Soviet Union created Kobalt teams to assist the command echelon of the 
Sarandoy.87 The teams were composed mostly of individuals with expertise in criminal 
investigation.88 The teams were mostly focused on carrying out operations to hunt the 
mujahedin leaders.89 Rodric Braithwaite is of the opinion that around 23 Kobalt teams 
were deployed in Afghanistan, each consisting of seven people with essential 
communications and transport to perform their tasks in the field to assist the command 
echelon of the Sarandoy and to track down the insurgents.90  
The major issues that the Soviets confronted with the Sarandoy were desertions 
and a trust deficit91 that seriously affected their performance and the Soviet dependence 
on them. The Soviets believed the Sarandoy to be infiltrated by the insurgents. Some 
Soviet advisors were of the view that a few ambushes in the past on Soviet personnel 
were likely the result of information provided by the Sarandoy to the insurgents.92 Soviet 
advisors were reluctant to share exact information with their counterparts in the Sarandoy 
units, even avoiding sharing exact operational plans, out of concern that this information 
would be leaked to the insurgents.  
b. Khidmat-e-Aetla’at-e-Dawlati  
The Khidmat-e-Aetla’at-e-Dawlati (KhAD)_—the Intelligence Agency of 
Afghanistan—existed before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was known as the 
AGSA (Department for Safeguarding the Interests of Afghanistan).93 Later, its name was 
changed to KAM (Workers’ Intelligence Department) and finally to KhAD. Initially, the 
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intelligence agency functioned as a department in the Prime Minister’s office.94 Later, it 
was upgraded to Wizarat-i-Amaniyyat-i-Dawlati (WAD), becoming a ministry in 1986.95  
The Soviets invested in the training, development, and expansion of the KhAD 
through their KGB, which played an instrumental role throughout its stay in Afghanistan. 
The KhAD was trained by the KGB both in the USSR as well as in Kabul in a training 
center.96 The Soviets increased the budget of the KhAD from 36 million Afghanis in 
1982/83 to more than 8,000 million Afghanis in 1985/86. The annual increases in budget 
are evident from the data of the annual strength of the KhAD presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Annual Strength of the KhAD97 
The KhAD’s tasks included establishment of intelligence networks throughout the 
country. It also carried out small-scale operations in support of the larger military 
operations against the mujahedin groups. The agency was also utilized by the Soviet 
KGB for negotiations with local leaders.98 The KhAD also functioned as political police 
involved in the arrests of opponents of the PDPA and its leaders in addition to its 
functions for the support of military operations. The KhAD was even successful in 
penetrating the camps of mujahedin groups inside Pakistan.  
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Later, however, friction developed between the Soviets and the KhAD, which was 
believed to have been infiltrated by the insurgents. The ensuing distrust between the KGB 
and the KhAD affected the overall output of the intelligence agency.99  
c. Development of the Forces Under the MoD  
During a decade-long effort, massive Soviet investment is visible in terms of the 
development and reorganization of the security forces, including the Afghan military, the 
Airforce, Border Guard, and the Afghan tribal and citizen militia.  
(1) The Afghan Military  
The political wrangling between various factions of the PDPA, and the coups 
before that, had seriously affected the functionality of the Armed forces. By 1980, the 
military strength had fallen to 25,000, which is a very alarming number and a serious 
weakness for a military that was comprised of three corps.100  
At the time of the invasion of Afghanistan, the military was organized into three 
corps (namely 1, 2, and 3 Corps,101) and ten divisions (details at Table 1.)102 The military 
was equipped with modern Soviet equipment like tanks, weapons, artillery, and air 
force.103 The force was, however, numerically depleted to a greater extent due to 
infighting between Khalq and Parcham factions of the PDPA.104 Both Hafizullah Amin 
and Babrak Karmal removed officers whose loyalty differed from theirs.  
Babrak Karmal desired to disband the entire existing Army, as he doubted its 
loyalty.105 But the Soviets considered it to be a colossal effort that would place a heavy 
and protracted burden of fighting on the 40th Army. As a result, Babrak Karmal was not 
allowed to make his grandest move against the army.  
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The Soviets undertook a major restructuring of the Afghan military after the 
invasion. According to Rodric Braithwaite, by the end 1980 the Soviet military had 
attached around 1,600–1,800 advisors with various Afghan military outfits, including 60–
80 General officers.106 The number of advisors in each military setup varied, e.g., each 
battalion had 3–4 officers, each regiment had 4–5 officers, and each division had 11 or 12 
Soviet officers with a matching number of interpreters.107 These advisors wore Afghan 
military uniforms and lived with the Afghan units. The advisors were mostly experienced 
military personnel and carried out training of the Afghan forces. They were required to 
coordinate the military operations of Afghan forces with the 40th Soviet Army. These 
advisors even participated directly in active operations, which is evident from the fact 
that two Soviet general officers died in Khost province in 1982 while supervising Afghan 
military operations in helicopters.108  
The Soviets divided the entire area into 21 zones of operation having various 
military commands.109 Each command had military personnel assisted by Soviet advisors 
along with the presence of KhAD teams. A major reorganization of the army was 
undertaken in 1984–1985.110 The Soviets established all infantry divisions along standard 
Soviet lines and utilized them only for hard-core military operations instead of engaging 
them in security duties. This measure was aimed to increase the combat potential of the 
military by not engaging them in security duties, which is primarily the task of police. In 
addition, many additional infantry and armored divisions were raised, besides completing 
the strength of the existing force. Details of the various divisions raised after the invasion 
is reflected in Table 1.  
After the Soviet invasion, desertion increased alarmingly as entire units and 
brigades started deserting. In Kunar province, for example, two entire brigades of 9 
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Division deserted.111 This incident was matched in other provinces. Although the force 
looked very solid on paper, on the ground the divisions were toothless. There were 
divisions with a total strength of only 1,000 present. (In contrast, there are generally 
10,000 personnel for a normal division.)112 To make up the manpower deficiency, the 
Soviets relaxed the conscription age and called up all reservists under 39 years of age.113 
The mass desertion of Afghan forces decreased considerably after 1980.114 Still, 
throughout their stay in Afghanistan, the Soviets considered a 30-percent desertion rate to 
be normal and acceptable.115 
Even before invasion, the Afghan Army relied heavily on Russian equipment. 
After the invasion, the Soviets provided a lot of equipment to the military to initially 
complete the existing deficiency and then address the ongoing losses during the Soviet 
tenure in Afghanistan. There was a time when there was more equipment than operators 
or drivers.116 Details of equipment held by the Afghan military appear in Table 1. 
Table 1. Data of Military Assistance by USSR to Afghanistan117 
Equipment 
Military Assistance from USSR 
Up to 1989 1989 
Handed over at the 
time of Withdrawal 
Tanks 767 305 
990 BMP118 491 283 
BTR119 1338 705 
Guns and Mortars 1212  224 
Light Weapons 119,000 40,000 231 
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The training of the Afghan military remained a focal point of the Soviet Union’s 
advisors throughout their stay in Afghanistan. The Soviet and Afghan forces trained 
separately, although they operated jointly.120 The basic training for young soldiers was 
spread over 45 to 60 days before they were inducted into actual combat.121 Yet, this 
practice was never followed strictly and young soldiers were inducted into combat with 
little or no training. The soldiers located in or close to Kabul received more training than 
others further from the capital. The Soviets also imparted general literacy training to the 
soldiers, besides training them in military subjects.122 
The training also included certain courses in the Soviet Union for better grooming 
of the military personnel.123 In 1987, the Soviets introduced a six-month specialized 
training program to be run in each corps.124 This program could not be followed strictly 
as at that time the Soviets focused more on imparting training to facilitate their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviet advisors were also of the view that joint 
operations served the purpose of training as the two forces would plan and execute the 
operations jointly.125 Throughout their stay in Afghanistan, however, the Soviet advisors 
complained of poor training standards of the Afghan military including lack of discipline, 
weak command and control, non-adherence to standard operating procedures (SOP), and 
very weak discipline.126  
The standard of the Afghan military remained low to the extent that before 
leaving the country, the Soviet Union’s advisors did not consider their counterpart units 
to be able to absorb attacks. They were only believed to be able to withstand an attack by 
the mujahedin if they are in large formations.127 Moreover, despite the development of 
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the Afghan military, their independent role during operations remained very limited, and 
they mostly remained dependent on their Soviet counterparts.    
(2) The Afghan Air Force 
The Afghan Air Force achieved better success compared to other organs of the 
military. Afghanistan had received Soviet-made air technology prior to the Saur 
revolution and in the years after that. At the start of the Soviet invasion, major air assets 
were stationed at Kabul, Bagram Shindand, Kandahar, and Mazar i Sharif.128 The Soviet 
Union kept its assets mostly in Kunduz, Faizabad, and Jalalabad.129  
The Soviets delivered assembled aircraft to Afghanistan before the invasion. At 
the time of the invasion, the Afghan Air Force was already equipped with MiG-21 PFs, 
which were later replaced by the Soviets with their MiG-21bis.130 Similarly, Afghan 
military aviation was also equipped with Soviet helicopters. The Soviet Union even 
supplied 45 Mi-35 to Afghan aviation in 1989/90.131 According to Antonio Giustozzi, the 
Soviet Union provided 76 planes and 36 helicopters to the Afghans before 1989. In 1989, 
they delivered another supply batch consisting of 59 planes and 12 helicopters.132 The 
military aid continued throughout the years of Soviet stay in Afghanistan. The financial 
assistance to the military is illustrated by Giustozzi in Table 2:  
Table 2. Soviet Military Assistance to Afghanistan133  
Year Assistance in millions of rubles Year Assistance in millions of rubles 
1980 267.6 1986 579.1 
1981 231.5 1987 1063.4 
1982 277.9 1988 1629 
1983 221.4 1989 3972 
1984 366.3 1990 2200 
1985 516.3   
                                                 
128 Oliker, 48. 
129 Oliker, 48. 
130 Oliker, 49. 
131 Giustozzi, 112. 
132 Giustozzi, 274. 
133 Adapted from Giustozzi, 274. 
29 
 
Throughout the Soviet period in Afghanistan, a sufficient number of pilots could 
not be trained on available air assets.134 This deficiency of pilots is even evident from the 
fact that the Soviets did not replace the old aircraft with the new Su-22Ms because there 
were not enough pilots to fly these craft.135 Independent flying by Afghans also remained 
an issue. The Afghan pilots had problems ranging from reluctance to fly during fasting 
period and on Fridays, lack of appetite for flying at all, and hesitation to drop heavy 
bombs (such as 500 kgs.) as they believed it to be an unjustified act against their fellow 
countrymen.136 Instead, they opted for lighter weapons for their limited destruction 
power.137 Lingering issues also included stealing of fuel and reluctance to keep the 
equipment battle-worthy.138 
(3) Border Guard 
The Border Guard comprised the forces under the MoD entrusted with guarding 
the frontiers of Afghanistan.139 A small border force comprised of only 1,200 personnel 
existed prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was tasked to perform customs 
duties only.140 The Border Guard were created in 1980 with the assistance of the Soviet 
military and the KGB,141 as the Soviets did not want to employ themselves in operations 
close to the border.142 The strength of the Border Guard kept increasing until 1983 as 
more and more people were recruited despite the recruitment and retention issues in 
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Afghanistan.143 By 1983, the strength of the Border Guard remained a healthy figure of 
27,725.144 After 1983, however, the Border Guard grew at a disappointing rate, as it is 
reported that in 1987 its strength was merely 30,000, which is an increase of only 3,000 
in four years.145 
The force was primarily employed and tasked to seal off the border with Pakistan, 
which was extremely porous and highly vulnerable due to the activities of the mujahedin. 
The force was trained mainly by the KGB and employed a number of techniques to seal 
the border, including mining, but failed to effectively perform the task due to a number of 
reasons.146 In later years, the tribal militias and Border Guard were integrated to form a 
joint force,147 although their effectiveness remained questionable.    
(4) Development of the Afghan Tribal and Citizen Militias  
The development of tribal and citizen militias is another noteworthy aspect that 
was undertaken by the Russians. The citizen militia was more of a propaganda tool as 
they were comprised of non-paid individuals who were members of the PDPA.148 The 
militia was used to protect the villages and towns from the mujahedin.  
The tribal militia was a more organized force that existed even before the 
revolution. The tribal militias also comprised the mujahedin forces loyal to the Afghan 
government or the mujahedin leaders who had defected from their previous 
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affiliations.149 The militias consisted of regional or tribal regiments and the border 
militias. The command structure of these militias varied. Some were commanded by 
military officers, though a few were commanded by their own elders, who were given 
military ranks. They reported either to the respective military units with which they were 
affiliated or to the KhAD.150  
The border militia was responsible for controlling the border and was placed 
under the MoD after switching from some other ministries. The border militia recruited 
from the local areas where they used to be deployed. They were commanded by military 
officers and trained through military units. The recruitment in these militias was used as a 
tool to reconcile with the tribes in adjoining areas through the provision of vacancies to 
tribal elders.151    
Regional militias were entrusted to maintain peace in the mainland of 
Afghanistan. These were the forces who were tasked and employed to check the 
movement of the mujahedin from one area to another by establishing various check 
posts.152  
A major restructuring of the militia was done in the tenure of Babrak Karmal.153 
He organized the militia in close liaison with the military and the KhAD. He also 
streamlined the selection process of the commanders of the militia units and gave due 
credence to the former mujahedin commanders. These regional militias were employed 
alongside the military units and normally formed an additional company of the regiment 
or an additional regiment of a brigade.154  
The Soviets used these militias as a second-tier force alongside the military. 
Moreover, the recruitment in the militia was done as a pacification tool to appease the 
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dissident mujahedin commanders. The joint strength of all the militia rose from 8,000 
members in 1980 to 170,000 in 1989, which is a solid strength.155  
2. Political Development and National Reconciliation  
The Soviets were divided in their opinion on the activation of political 
pacification measures. Few advisors thought that the overthrow of Amin would, by itself, 
be a positive message to the public and that resentment against the government would 
subside. There were others who, even as early as 1980, considered military action as a 
non-solution to the problems of Afghanistan.156  
The government took some pacification measures in the beginning of 1980, when 
an effort was made to contact the active mujahedin commanders to achieve some sort of 
national reconciliation to counter the growing uprising against the Soviets. But the 
contacts could not be continued mainly due to the strong opposition of the Soviet 
advisors and the PDPA leadership.157 The government decided to establish party offices 
by raising district units to bring more people into the fold of the PDPA, but the execution 
could not be done as planned.158 It was basically due to the lack of requisite control in all 
the districts.  
Overall, the political development can be divided into two main categories: 1) the 
pacification policy, which continued until 1987; and 2) the national reconciliation, which 
was started by Babrak Karmal but was more often associated with President Najibullah 
from 1987 until the Soviet Union’s withdrawal and even later until 1992.  
Although the Soviet Union could not achieve a broad-based political 
reconciliation, the local-level reconciliation remained the focus of the Soviet occupation. 
Kunduz in 1980, Kunar in 1984, the Nazian valley south of Jalalabad in 1980, and Zabul 
in 1984 are a few examples where local reconciliation was done with government 
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forces.159 This arrangement was more likely necessitated by the repression of the local 
population by the mujahedin of the area.160 The KhAD remained instrumental in 
achieving such breakthroughs with informal agreements.161 But an agreement reached at 
any one time did not mean reconciliation forever.  
The Soviets also used economic levers for political favor.162 An effort was made 
to increase the prices of cotton – a commercial crop, inducing the people to cultivate 
cotton instead of wheat, which would benefit the peasants and earn their support for the 
government. Moreover, the government also started purchasing wheat from local 
peasants at a higher rate to benefit this particular class and to make it harder for the 
mujahedin to purchase an expensive dietary staple.163  
The first proper attempt to find a political solution to the government’s isolation 
came in 1981.164 The government announced an amnesty on July 18, 1981 for all those 
who laid down their arms.165 The major step for pacification was the creation of the 
National Fatherland Front (NFF), which was apparently not a PDPA. Through this 
measure, an effort was done to target those who wanted to side with the government, but 
at the same time were against the ideology of the PDPA.166 Many jirga167 were held 
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under the umbrella of the NFF, but the first two years did not see any major 
development.168  
The NFF mainly targeted tribal elders and gave them more liberty of economic 
and development work besides giving them authority to nominate various members for 
the functioning of government.169 It tried to engage the Pashtun population and even 
nominated Saleh Muhammad Zeray of the Durrani tribe from Kandahar province as the 
first president of the NFF.170   
The NFF, however, could not deliver much, and by 1987 its decline as a 
pacification strategy was evident. It could not penetrate the rural areas and only found 
routes in a few major cities and towns. Moreover, it failed to engage the majority of the 
Pashtun population and concentrated more in northern areas.171 In 1987, President 
Najibullah declared the NFF to be a failure because it was seen as an extension of the 
PDPA.172 
After the failure of the NFF, Najibullah formed a new government in Afghanistan 
in 1987 and adopted an ambitious program of ‘national reconciliation’.173 National 
reconciliation mainly targeted the peasant class and advocated political pluralism against 
one-party rule supported by Babrak Karmal. National reconciliation was based on a 
three-point approach: 1) a cease fire for at least six months; 2) commencement of 
dialogue with warring factions; and 3) establishment of a coalition government with 
representation of all the factions and stake holders.174 In mid-1987, a law was approved 
for legalizing political parties after a six-month ceasefire with the mujahedin groups.175  
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Najibullah offered various proposals for national reconciliation, such as greater 
economic benefits coupled with more political pluralism. The mujahedin groups were 
offered more room for independence and less governmental control as exercised in the 
past if they joined hands with the government.176 The mujahedin groups rejected the 
ceasefire offer through their spokesman Burhanuddin Rabbani.177 Although the Peshawar 
parties rejected the reconciliation policy, many approached the government for accruing 
benefits.178  
In 1987, the Loya Jirga ratified a new constitution for Afghanistan that abolished 
the one-party system; established Loya Jirga, Sena, and Wolasi Jirga; and changed the 
name of the country from the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Republic of 
Afghanistan.179 Upon ratification of the new constitution, elections in Afghanistan were 
held in April 1988.180 The mujahedin groups boycotted the elections, thereby diminishing 
the utility of elections for enduring peace in the future. The national reconciliation 
strategy initiated by President Najibullah with Soviet backing could not meet the desired 
expectations.  
3. Economic Development and Nation Building 
Afghan economic dependence on the Soviet Union181 increased manifold after the 
invasion of Afghanistan as the Soviets believed that the military alone was not the 
solution to the complexities of the Afghan issue. They believed in a long-term approach 
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encompassing both military and economic aid coupled with kinetic operations.182 
Military aid to Afghanistan during the period from 1968 to 1978 remained at an average 
of 95 million rubles annually. In contrast, military aid from 1980 to 1989 increased as 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Soviet Military Aid to Afghanistan (millions of rubles)183 
The data shown in Figure 4 imply that the Soviets increased the military aid 
drastically after the invasion. The major aid was increased substantially in the years 1988 
and 1989 (i.e., the time when the Soviets’ withdrawal had commenced).  
The Soviets brought their five-year economic cycle system to Afghanistan, with a 
focus on increasing the bilateral trade and enhancing the state share in various projects.184 
Mining and manufacturing proved to be successful public sectors. The Afghan 
government fully controlled the oil and gas industry and earned a handsome return from 
it through the transportation of resources to the Soviet Union, which influenced the 
industries through its technicians and therefore had full technical control over it.185  
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The Soviets invested heavily in building the industrial enterprises through the 
provision of technical skills. The Soviets built around 100 industrial enterprises by 1986 
which had a far-reaching impact on the economic output of Afghanistan.186 A few 
notable development projects included the establishment of a textile mill in Kandahar, a 
transportation service in Kabul, the Jarkuduq gas field, and a fertilizer plant in Mazar-i-
Sharif, etc.187 The main area targeted for development projects was northern Afghanistan, 
as this area was relatively peaceful and development work was possible. This model of 
state presence in the industrial sector continued until 1986, when Najibullah changed the 
economic policy toward privatization.188 He allowed a number of private sector projects 
with the obvious aim of appeasing the elite class.  
Afghanistan’s agriculture sector also received the Soviets’ attention. The efforts 
to influence the agriculture sector, however, substantially failed. The land reform 
initiative that was launched by Hafizullah Amin seriously back fired. The government’s 
plan to influence the rural areas through such measures proved counter-productive.  
As previously mentioned, the government raised the prices of cotton in an effort 
to gain favor with the local farmers and simultaneously make a staple diet of mujahedin 
more expensive.189 The idea could not yield better results, and the agricultural sector 
remained under developed due to the struggle between the government and the 
mujahedin. A major portion of population that was dependent on agriculture could not 
benefit.190  
Foreign aid remained a hallmark of the Afghan economy during the entire 
occupation period by the Soviets. The Afghan government could not resolve the issue of 
reliance on foreign aid during the period from 1978 to 1988.191 During this period, 
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Afghanistan’s expenditures surpassed its revenues exceedingly.192 The foreign aid was 
8.9 billion Afghanis ($ 178 million) in 1980.193 By 1988, it increased to 33.8 billion 
Afghanis ($676 million).194 The situation had very adverse effects on the public as the 
prices of daily need commodities increased by 500 percent to 1,000 percent.195  
To conclude, it can be said that the Soviets launched massive combat operations 
to help the falling pro-communist PDPA re-establish its writ in the territory. The military 
operation met with a qualified success in the beginning. The Soviets associated the 
military operation with an extensive regime stabilization reform strategy along with a 
political policy for pacification of the insurgents. However, this strategy could not yield 
the desired results of controlling the entire population and area. The solution to the 
problem actually lay elsewhere. 
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III. THE U.S.-LED COALITION’S STATE STABILIZATION 
EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN 
On January 28, 2018, a Taliban attacker detonated an ambulance loaded with 
explosives in Kabul, killing 95 people and wounding 191 others.196 This attack happened 
only one week after the Taliban targeted a famous hotel in the capital city of Kabul, 
resulting in the deaths of 22 people.197 In August 2018, the Taliban attacked the city of 
Ghazni, which is less than a hundred miles from Kabul, killing dozens of security forces 
and controlling it for days before coalition forces finally defeated them.198 During the 
Ghazni attacks, Afghan security forces relied heavily on U.S. special forces and air power 
to beat back the Taliban.199 These attacks in and so close to the capital—a high-security 
zone—raise doubts regarding the ability of the Afghan security forces to operate without 
coalition support. That these attacks are frequent, even after 17 years of war, speaks to 
the need for continued support of the Afghan forces and state institutions.   
This chapter details the U.S.-led coalition’s state/regime stabilization efforts in 
Afghanistan. Specifically, it finds that the extensive coalition efforts in Afghanistan are 
still far from ensuring stability of the country.   
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND—THE U.S.-LED COALITION’S 
INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 
Afghanistan witnessed widespread suffering even after the Soviet withdrawal in 
1989 due to infighting between various mujahedin groups. Rather than a process of state 
stabilization, the remaining state institutions were totally destroyed amid a decade-long 
conflict. Unfortunately, the world also turned a blind eye to the country because with the 
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communist bloc contained, Afghanistan held no further interest to the world powers. A 
cancer that had developed in the late 1970s was left to metastasize at a time when it 
needed immediate attention. By 1995, continuous Afghan destabilization gave rise to the 
Taliban, which crept all over the country, ultimately controlling 95 percent of 
Afghanistanexcept for a small part in the north of the country where a famous warlord, 
Ahmed Shah Masoud, remained entrenched. The authoritarian Taliban regime instituted a 
brutal government that ruthlessly handled opponents. Afghanistan descended further into 
chaos. It also gave protection and space to the notorious al-Qaeda elements who used 
Afghanistan for their clandestine activities. Terrorists with ties to Afghanistan killed 
3,000-plus innocent civilians in the United States on September 11, 2001.200 
On October 7, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush addressed the nation in a 
televised address informing the world that the U.S. military was invading Afghanistan in 
an operation named Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).201 The actual contacts with the 
Northern Alliance forces’ commanders in the Panjshir Valley in north Afghanistan had 
started much earlier.202 General Muhammad Fahim and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, leaders 
of the Northern Alliance forces, were engaged for rallying an offensive against the 
Taliban.203  
The invasion slid Afghanistan further into chaos, and the Taliban regime 
crumbled in the face of OEF. Although they were ousted, the Taliban could not be 
annihilated totally and were replaced by a Northern Alliance dominated group that 
consisted mostly of anti-Pashtun elements—a factor on which the Taliban relied for their 
resurgence in the latter half of the decade. 
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B. U.S.-LED COALITION’S STATE STABILIZATION MEASURES IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
The U.S.-led coalition’s strategy of state stabilization evolved over time in the 
face of a fluid insurgency. In the beginning, the operational focus remained on combat 
operations to overthrow the repressive Taliban regime and replace it with a transitional 
government. Initially, also, the U.S. military that was engaged in Afghanistan had 
antipathy for any state stabilization measures.204 The military remained reluctant to 
support nation-building in Afghanistan and only recognized its value once the Taliban 
started a strong insurgency in 2004.205 Operations in Iraq also proved to be a major 
distraction to the war in Afghanistan.206 The United Nations Secretary General remarked, 
“The billions spent in Iraq were the billions that were not spent in Afghanistan.”207 Only 
at the end of George W. Bush’s presidency did nation building in Afghanistan gain 
maximum momentum and attention.208  
The condition of state institutions in 2001 was deplorable. The institutions hardly 
existed due to the chaotic environment from 1979 to 2001. The infighting between the 
mujahedin groups resulted into total annihilation of the remnant state institutions like the 
ministries and the security forces. Almost everything had to be built from scratch, 
requiring great effort, energies, and funding as compared to the previous regime 
stabilization measures in Afghanistan during the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan. The 
stabilization efforts of the U.S.-led coalition focused on building Afghanistan’s security 
forces to include the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police 
(ANP), political development including introduction of a presidential form of democracy 
and national reconciliation barring Taliban factions, and economic as well as 
infrastructural development.  
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The United Nations held donors’ conferences in January 2002 and April 2002 in 
Tokyo and Geneva, respectively, that focused on the state stabilization measures.209 In 
Tokyo, the donor countries pledged $4.5 billion to support the task of rebuilding 
Afghanistan.210 The conference raised many hopes of rebuilding Afghanistan but did not 
differentiate between humanitarian relief and infrastructural development. Subsequently, 
the next two years focused more on humanitarian work.211 The conference in April 2002 
focused specifically on the development of the state institutions. In the conference, the 
United States took responsibility for building the ANA, Germany took responsibility for 
rebuilding the ANP, Italy took responsibility for development of the justice system, 
Britain took responsibility for the counter-narcotics effort, and Japan took over 
responsibility for disarming the militias.212 In the latter half of the decade, the 
responsibilities and set targets continued to evolve for a better and synergized effort for 
state stabilization.  
1. Building of the Security Forces 
The U.S.-led coalition’s focal effort remained on Security Force Assistance 
(SFA).213 During the donor conference in April 2002, the United States took 
responsibility for rebuilding the ANA while Germany took the lead in rebuilding the 
ANP.214 In the initial period, the SFA mainly focused on limited development to ensure 
rebuilding forces free of Taliban influence.215The elections of 2004/2005 in Afghanistan 
necessitated major development of the SFA to ensure the holding of peaceful elections. 
The hasty arrangements affected the development process. The SFA gained momentum, 
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however, after the surge of the Taliban toward the end of the second term of President 
George W. Bush, when more funds were allocated.216 An exhaustive effort was 
undertaken for the rebuilding, development, training, and provisioning of equipment to 
the security forces of Afghanistan. Approximately $29 billion were spent from 2002 to 
2010 for the SFA.217  
The United States commenced SFA efforts by opening an Office of Security 
Cooperation (OSC) in the U.S. embassy in Afghanistan.218 In 2003, the U.S. State 
Department started assisting the police training through hiring DynCorp International.219 
In 2005, Combined Security and Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A) was 
established to develop the ANA and later the ANP.220 A NATO-led security force named 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), established by the United Nations in 
2001 in light of decisions in the Bonn conference,221 formed a joint command in 
Afghanistan in October 2009 called the ISAF Joint Command or IJC for looking after the 
development of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).222 NATO Training Mission-
Afghanistan (NTM-A) was established in 2009 and combined with the CSTC-A to look 
after the SFA in Afghanistan.223  
a. The Afghan Military 
The major focus of the U.S.-led coalition remained on the development of the 
ANA, which was considered to be a centerpiece in the effort to establish peace in the 
country. U.S. General Tommy Franks deemed development of the ANA to be an 
important step in ensuring prosperity and peace in free Afghanistan.224  
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The 1990s had transformed the ANA into militias under different warlords.225 The 
central concept of a national army was completely abolished due to lack of a central 
government. The army operating under the Taliban was also non-existent after the 
invasion of 2001 by the United States. Hence, the ANA had to be raised from the scratch, 
which required considerable effort. Moreover, in view of the defeat of the Taliban in the 
beginning, before their reemergence in the latter half of the decade, the initial plan of the 
U.S.-led coalition was to build a small, but well-trained Afghan National Army.226 After 
the reemergence of the Taliban however, the focus shifted toward quantity also.  
In the beginning, the United States relied on certain militias that were helpful 
against the Taliban and termed them Afghan Security Forces (ASF).227 These forces were 
not part of the Afghan government and were paid wholly by the United States.228 With 
the passage of time, the need arose to develop and ethnically balance a well-trained army 
under the control of the central government.  
The Pentagon’s initial efforts for development of the ANA was a lukewarm 
approach. The efforts commenced in April 2002 when the United States pledged $290 
million a year for the development of the ANA in the Bonn conference of the donor 
countries.229 The bureaucratic delays resulted in non-implementation of the plans until 
June 2002. The pledges remained pledges, and the United States dedicated only $70 
million in 2002. This sum increased in 2003 to $151million.230 These resources dedicated 
for the development of the ANA were extremely less, which is also evident from the fact 
that after the reemergence of the Taliban, the total amount dedicated for the development 
of the ANSF from 2006 to 2008 rose to $5.9 billion.231 The initial reluctance of the 
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Pentagon and its subsequent realization of the importance of the building of a strong 
ANA delayed the development process of the ANA. The funding for the ANA kept 
increasing after 2008. By June 2014, the United States had spent $31.9 billion to raise 
and train the ANA.232 
The planning strength of the ANA also varied over the years for different reasons 
ranging from the bureaucratic delays to the prevalent environment of the Taliban 
insurgency. The initial plans were to develop an ANA with a total strength of 60,000 
personnel.233 The planning included raising seven military corps covering the entire area 
of Afghanistan. Six corps were planned to be combat, and one stationed in Kabul was to 
be quick-reaction corps.234 Out of six corps, four were focused on the south and southeast 
(201, 203, 205, and 215 Corps), while two were focused on the north (207 and 209 
Corps).235  
There has been a gradual increase in the strength of the ANA over the years. The 
United States planned to train 12,000 ANA troops by April 2003,236 but the goal was 
revised to training 9,000 personnel by November 2003 as the planned figures could not 
be met.237 These ambitious goals affected the training considerably. By the spring of 
2006, when the Taliban had launched a major offensive in the south, the ANA comprised 
37,000 personnel instead of the initially planned total strength of 60,000 personnel.238 
The strength of the ANA kept increasing in response to the Taliban insurgency 
and the realization of the importance of the ANA to the coalition’s policy makers. The 
strength of the ANA reached 81,000 before April 2009 and touched the 92,000 mark by 
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September 2009.239 It further increased to 100,131 personnel by December 2009.240 By 
June 2014, the total strength of the ANA was 188,170 personnel, including 6,731 
personnel of the Afghan Air Force.241 Recruitment and retention challenges continuously 
affected the ANA’s strength development.242 
The United States devised an elaborate training system for the ANA. The training 
of the ANA commenced in May 2002 under the Special Forces Group of the United 
States.243 The training regime was two-fold with initial training in the Kabul Military 
Training Center (KMTC) and subsequent training through a newly devised advisory 
mission called Embedded Training Teams (ETTs).244 The ETTs conducted the training in 
the ANA battalions called kandaks. Each ETT was comprised of 16 U.S. personnel who 
were scheduled to remain with the Afghan kandaks and brigades to prepare them for 
various operations.245  
The training of the ANA gained momentum in 2004, as the Taliban started 
increasing their influence in the Afghanistan.246 The training capacity of the KMTC was 
increased considerably to training five kandaks every month by January 2005.247 The 
focus on quantity shifted back to quality in 2005 as it was decided to train two kandaks 
every month. The shift was necessitated by the lack of requisite funds for the KMTC and 
difficulty in fielding the required number of ETTs with each kandak.248 The training 
duration of each kandak was also reduced from 14 weeks to ten weeks.249  
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ETTs proved to be a good step in training the ANA. ETTs even conducted combat 
operations with their affiliated ANA outfits.250 Provision of the required number of ETTs 
personnel remained a problem however. The increase in the ANA’s strength in 2005 put 
extra drain on the ETTs. With an increase in the training of extra kandaks in the KMTC, 
the requirement of ETT personnel rose from 410 to 700.251 To compound the deficiency, 
the number of personnel in each ETT was decreased from 16 to 12 personnel.252 
Although the number of personnel for the ETT was increased in 2005 by the U.S., the 
gap could not be filled entirely.253 In 2007, the total requirement of the ETT exceeded 
3000 personnel, but just more than 1000 personnel could be provided to the ANA.254 The 
quality of the trainers also remained an issue as many U.S. personnel were put in the field 
with limited advisory training. 
Desertion and attrition had been major issues concerning ANA development. The 
desertion rate in 2003 was 22 percent and was linked to salary issues and discipline 
problems.255 In 2005, it increased to 25 percent, and it decreased to 16 percent in 2006.256 
The desertion rate was so high in 2004 and 2005, especially in the field formations, that 
in the 205th Corps deployed in Kandahar, 1200–1500 personnel deserted out of a total 
strength of 2,400 personnel. That is more than 50 percent for that particular corps.257 The 
rise in desertion during the period of 2004 to 2005 can be attributed to the increased 
attacks by the Taliban.258 From 2006 to 2007, the official desertion rate improved and 
remained between 12 percent and 13 percent. The rate of soldiers going absent without 
leave (AWOL) remained alarmingly high. In 2006, it was reported that the AWOL 
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figures remained as high as 40 percent.259 These calculations were done for a regional 
corps in Herat. The desertion rates reduced considerably during the years nearing 
2014.260  
Attrition remained a continuous problem for the ANA. Some 39,136 ANA 
personnel were removed from the ANA’s strength in 2013/2014.261 The casualty rate 
remained a concern as 2,330 ANA personnel were killed and 12,696 were wounded in 
action from 2012 to 2014.262  
Despite extensive efforts, no ANA unit was considered fit for conducting 
independent operation until August 2007. The situation improved after 2007. In 2008, 18 
out of 72 ANA kandaks were given CM1 status (Capability Milestone status, capable to 
act independently with specific assistance from the coalition forces).263 The system of 
awarding CM status is not very reliable as the data required for assessment is provided by 
the ANA units and is not considered very accurate.264 The situation improved manifold 
later as the ANA was considered more reliable than the ANP and mostly led operations 
with specific assistance from the coalition forces. Nonetheless, the ANA’s performance 
against the Taliban offensive cast serious doubts on its capability to perform 
independently.265 During the recent attacks by the Taliban, the ANA relied exceedingly 
on coalition forces for the clearance of areas occupied by the Taliban insurgents.   
In October 2014, Rahim Wardak, a former Afghan defense minister, deemed the 
ANA to be a child, not even a teenager.266 Even in early 2014, the ANA’s dependence on 
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NATO remained a worrisome factor. The dependence mostly related to air and medical 
support.267 
b. The Afghan National Police 
Germany took the responsibility for rebuilding the ANP during the donor 
conference held in 2002 under the auspices of the United Nations.268 Germany 
commenced the formal process of rebuilding the ANP by signing an agreement with the 
Afghan Interior Ministry in March 2002.269 Germany started reforms of the ANP by 
considering the existing police officials, unlike the rebuilding process of the ANA, which 
was raised from scratch. 
Germany’s performance in the police reform sector remained far below the 
expected level.270 Germany initiated a reform process with five priority areas that 
included providing advice for the reform, reconstruction of buildings, provision of 
equipment, coordination of donor activities, and raising the Kabul Police Academy 
(KPA).271 Between 2002 and 2006, Germany expanded a meagre amount of $89 million 
for rebuilding the ANP and provided only 41 trainers to train 3,500 police personnel over 
a time period of three years.272 Germany could not do much other than standing up the 
KPA.273 By 2006, a force of only 3,302 could be rolled out of the KPA.274 Most of the 
ANP in different regions remained without any training at all.  
The United States stepped into the ANP reform system in 2003 and incorporated 
DynCorp through the State Department by allocating $24 million for setting up seven 
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regional training centers.275 Afghanistan was divided into eight zones that corresponded 
largely to the deployment pattern of the ANA. Although required training could not be 
imparted to the ANP due to a limited number of trainers, the strength of the force kept 
increasing, reaching 65,000 at the start of 2007.276 The ANP was so undertrained that an 
assessment detailed that at least 85 percent of police officers lacked the ability to perform 
basic police tasks.277  
Although the strength of the ANP was officially at 82,000 personnel by May 
2007, the ground situation reported was much different from the official stance.278There 
were serious irregularities in the payrolls of the regional ANP. The salaries kept flowing 
out of the fund, but the police on the ground did not exist.279 Only 35–60 police were 
reported in 2006 to be in each district of the Kandahar province.280 Such irregularities 
continued even until 2014, when the overall strength of the ANP was reported to be 
150,688.281 According to a report of the U.S. Department of Defense in August 2014, 
4,500 ANP personnel in pay rolls were found to be bogus, amounting to improper 
payment of $40 million.282 
The system of advisors with field units of the ANP commenced in the same 
manner already employed in the ANA. DynCorp fielded the first batch of 16 police 
trainers with the field units of the ANP in early 2005 but could not expand the program 
further due to security limitation and economic costs.283 The United States designated the 
ETTs to mentor the police units instead of the ANA. Police mentoring expanded from 
2005 to 2007 when separate Police Mentoring Teams (PMTs) evolved. The PMTs were 
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mostly comprised of military personnel.284 The gap between the required number of 
PMTs and the assigned figure remained considerable however. In July 2008, the ANP 
was short of 2300 PMTs—a deficiency that is exceedingly high.285  
The CSTC-A had already been in the driver’s seat of the ANP reform process by 
2005.286 The CSTC-A took three main steps to reform the ANP. The first step was to 
reform the pay and rank structure and standardize the entire ANP on one line.287 Second, 
in September 2006, the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) was raised to enable 
the police to counter the growing insurgency.288 The ANAP was established in 21 
provinces with governors recruiting the local police to assist in law and order, reaching a 
reasonable strength of 11,271 personnel.289 ANAP, however, encountered serious issues 
like the infiltration of Taliban elements in their rank and file, poor training standards, and 
disloyalty to the central government.290 As a result, the force was disbanded on 
September 30, 2008.291 The third step for reform in police was raising the Afghan 
National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) in 2006.292 The ANCOP was raised after the 
existing ANP failed to control riots that erupted in Kabul in May 2006 after the killing of 
five civilians in a roadside accident involving a U.S. military convoy.293 Over the years, 
the force increased to eight brigades and was designated as the Public Security Police 
with a strength of 2,550 personnel.294 The force was established to act as a rapid reaction 
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force, designed to operate in high-threat areas.295 Unfortunately, the reforms could not 
yield better results, and the ANP remained a below par force.296 Training, equipping, and 
the advisory system were the main hurdles in the evolution of the ANP.297 The 
employment concept also hurt the ANP, who mostly faced the brunt of the insurgency as 
they were mostly employed in the lead role.298 
The CSTC-A undertook another reform effort in November 2007 to retrain the 
entire personnel of the ANP.299 The CSTC-A introduced a Focused District Development 
(FDD) concept to train the entire police of each district at one time while temporarily 
giving its responsibilities to the ANCOP.300 After training was complete, designated 
PMTs were required to accompany the ANP unit for further training until the time the 
unit qualified for CM1 level.301 The FDD program proved useful in the beginning but 
later lost its utility due to slow progress and the limitation in provision of required PMTs 
as by 2009 only 65 out of 365 police districts could complete the planned training.302 
Currently, the ANP comprises the normal Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), 
ANCOP, the Afghan Border Police (ABP), and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) besides a 
few other subordinate forces. The AUP is a regular Afghan police force designated with 
routine law and order duties but heavily involved in counter-insurgency operations 
alongside the ANA. Then ANCOP is a rapid reaction force as highlighted earlier. The 
ABP is a border force whose major strength was transferred to the MoD in December 
2017.303 By contrast, troops detailed on customs duties at the border and on airports 
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remained under the MoI.304 The ALP was formed in 2010 and has been trained by the 
U.S. Special Forces.305 The force is locally recruited and is an irregular force operating 
under the MoI. The ALP consisted of 26,451 in June 2014.306 Despite the concerns of 
many based on the negative aspects of the ALP being more of a militia than a police 
force, the ALP is continuing as a segment of the ANP. 
The ANP still faces numerous issues. In spite of the extensive efforts by the 
coalition forces in terms of time and resources, the ANP is currently seen as a force 
which is still far from being designated as a professional police force. The ANP is ripe 
with corruption, drug trade, and criminal acts and is disloyal with incidents of defection 
to Taliban and the selling of equipment in large scale to insurgents as highlighted by the 
deputy governor of Ghazni province in December 2013.307 The presence of “ghost” 
police personnel in the ANP is also a serious concern; a significant number of personnel 
only existed on paper and were not present on the ground to perform the duties.308 The 
heavy attrition rate is also a serious issue. The attrition rate for the ANP is much higher 
than the ANA,309 probably due to the poor training standards. The ANP lost 1,165 
personnel from January 2007 to September 2008.310 During the same period, the ANA 
lost 420 personnel.311 In 2009, the corresponding casualty ratio between the ANP and the 
ANA increased to four times.312 The sad saga of high attrition rate continued over the 
years. In only six months of 2014, the ANP lost 3,738 personnel (1,368 killed and 2,370 
wounded).313 These high attrition rates have seriously affected the output of the force. 
                                                 
304 Department of Defense, United States of America, Enhancing Security and Stability in 
Afghanistan (Report to Congress, June 2018), 103, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Jul/03/2001938620/-1/-
1/1/1225-REPORT-JUNE-2018-FINAL-UNCLASS-BASE.PDF. 
305 Sedra, “An Uncertain Future for Afghanistan’s Security Sector,” 7. 
306 Sedra, 7. 
307 Sedra, 5. 
308 Sedra, 6. 
309 Sedra, 6. 
310 Cordesman, Burke, Kasten, and Mausner, iv. 
311 Cordesman, Burke, Kasten, and Mausner, iv. 
312 Cordesman, Burke, Kasten, and Mausner, 121. 
313 Sedra, “An Uncertain Future for Afghanistan’s Security Sector,” 6. 
54 
2. Political Development and National Reconciliation  
The U.S.-led coalition initiated a detailed process of political development in 
Afghanistan by introducing a presidential form of democracy. The details regarding path 
to democracy and national reconciliation steps in Afghanistan would be covered in 
succeeding paras. 
a. Path to Democracy 
Political development toward democracy in Afghanistan started after the fall of 
the Taliban regime when various stakeholders—not including the Taliban—held a 
conference in Bonn, Germany. The Bonn conference, held from November 27 to 
December 4, 2001, was attended mainly by anti-Taliban factions and set a framework for 
the future political mosaic of the country. Held under the auspices of the United Nations, 
the conference was attended by four major Afghan stakeholders in addition to the 
representatives of regional powers like Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan.314 The four 
Afghan delegations included the Northern Alliance group headed by Younis Qanooni, 
who controlled most of the Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban regime; the Rome 
group, under the ex-King Zahir Shah and represented by Dr. Abdul Sattar Sirat; and the 
Cyprus group who had close ties to the Iran and Peshawar group that consisted mostly of 
Pashtuns refugees in Pakistan.315 Hamid Karzai, the future President of Afghanistan, 
participated in the conference through a satellite telephone operated by the CIA from 
Kandahar.316 The ousted regime of the Taliban was absent from the conference for the 
future of Afghanistan. 
The Bonn conference initiated a political process that set Afghanistan on a 
democratic path, albeit a bumpy, long, and uncertain one. The Bonn conference set a path 
for the future holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga,317 the formation of a transitional 
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government under Hamid Karzai, the conduct of Constitutional Jirga that would draft the 
new constitution for Afghanistan, and the presidential and parliamentary elections of 
2004–2005.318 The Bonn agreement established an interim administration for six months 
under the chairmanship of Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun hailing from Kandahar.319 Loya Jirga 
convened in June 2002 and elected an Afghan Transitional Administration (ATA) under 
the presidency of Hamid Karzai.320 President Hamid Karzai appointed a cabinet of ATA 
with warlords and tribal leaders occupying all the influential posts.321  
The adoption of the Afghan constitution in January 2003 also put the country on a 
democratic path. A constitutional Loya Jirga drafted the constitution for Afghanistan 
which was adopted by consensus.322 The new Afghan constitution called for a 
presidential form of government and approved the formation of two houses: the rysi 
Jirga, the lower house, and the Meshrano Jirga, the upper house.323 Afghanistan was 
declared an Islamic republic, and Pashto and Dari became the national languages.324 The 
ATA administration announced separate presidential and parliamentary elections to be 
held in 2004 and 2005, respectively.325 
Interim President Hamid Karzai stood for the presidential elections along with 15 
other candidates and secured the win with 55 percent of the votes.326 The presidential 
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election of 2004 was a success in terms of the overall security environment of the 
country.327 The Taliban failed to disrupt the elections beyond a certain level.328 The 
turnout for the election remained over 70 percent.329 The elections were affected more by 
charges of vote-rigging than by Taliban violence.  
President Hamid Karzai’s first tenure is tainted by both the rise of warlords in the 
government and corruption in the ministries.330 President Karzai initially tried to limit the 
powerful warlords with Western help, but later he tried to reconcile with the same 
warlords as he saw little assistance coming from the U.S.-led coalition.331 To ensure 
political survival, the Karzai administration gave patronage to the notorious warlords by 
appointing them to important slots in the government.332 Corruption, extensive 
indulgence of the drug trade, and the lack of rule of law remained the other major issues 
related to President Karzai’s rule.333  
The second Afghan presidential and parliamentary elections further weakened 
democratic progress in the country. The 2009 elections were held with Afghan 
institutions in the lead.334 The elections were initially planned for May 2009 but were 
delayed until August due to serious security issues as the Taliban vowed to disrupt the 
election process.335 The security situation became challenging due to increased Taliban 
attacks. The number of casualties for the coalition, the ANA, the ANP, and civilians 
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increased alarmingly.336 In 2009 alone, coalition fatalities reached 520 personnel—an 
increase of 76 percent from the previous year—and civilian casualties reached 5,978, 
while casualties of the ANA and the ANP were 928 personnel.337 This seriously hurt the 
security equilibrium and affected the elections greatly. On election day alone, 400 attacks 
were reported by the ISAF.338 The threats by the Taliban also affected the election 
turnout, which became as low as 40 percent as compared to 70 percent in the last 
elections.339  
Serious election irregularities also tarnished the elections. Two leading candidates 
for the election were sitting President Hamid Karzai, who was running for re-election, 
and sitting Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.340 Hamid Karzai was alleged to have 
committed major election fraud, including denial of voting in majority areas of Abdullah 
Abdullah and showing inflated turnout to benefit Karzai.341 More than a million votes 
were invalidated after the recount.342 Other presidential candidates also questioned the 
transparency of the elections.  
Hamid Karzai could not secure 50 percent of the votes required to avoid a second 
round of elections. A second round of voting—a run-off election between the two leading 
candidates—was scheduled to be held on November 7, 2009.343 However, Abdullah 
Abdullah withdrew from the run-off election on the pretext of foreseeable irregularities 
by the Afghan Election Commission. After his withdrawal, Hamid Karzai was declared 
the winner of the presidential polls of 2009. 
The parliamentary elections of 2010 were also affected by the dwindling security 
spectrum. The elections were initially scheduled to be held in May 2010 but were later 
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postponed to be held in September 2010.344 By the time of the parliamentary elections, 
there had been surge in the U.S. and coalition forces as the total U.S.-led coalition then 
roughly numbered 150,000 personnel.345 The security situation remained volatile 
however. Leading up to the election, many election candidates were assassinated, and 
election-related staff and innocent civilians were killed.  
The poor security situation showed up through low election turnout: 40 percent.346 
There were reports of serious election irregularities. Out of 10 million eligible voters, 3.6 
million voted for the Wolesi Jirga candidates.347 Later, 1.5 million votes were turned 
down as being bogus.348 This brings the total turnout for the 2010 parliamentary elections 
to 21 percent, far below the expectations.349 On the other hand, the positive aspect of the 
election was that over 50 percent of the newly elected members of Wolesi Jirga were new 
faces. Despite the controversies over election fraud, the new parliament started 
functioning by the end January 2011.350 The second tenure of President Hamid Karzai 
continued until the appointment of Ashraf Ghani as the next president in 2014. 
b. National Reconciliation 
National reconciliation in Afghanistan could not be pursued in true letter and 
spirit. Intermittent efforts continued in one form or the other along with the combat 
operations by the U.S.-led coalition. The coalition however could not succeed in making 
a complete wedge between the Pashtuns and the Taliban, a failure that helped the Taliban 
in continuing and further establishing their control in these areas. The failure in engaging 
the Taliban in a national reconciliation effort has accrued serious weakening of the 
government’s writ in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s grip over Afghanistan is evident from 
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their enhanced control in various districts of the country and the continued targeting of 
even the safest areas inside Kabul. The U.S.-led coalition started engaging various 
warlords of Afghanistan after throwing out the Taliban regime, but this could not be 
termed as a national reconciliation program.  
The first concrete national reconciliation program was started in the first half of 
2003 when President Hamid Karzai vowed his willingness to talk to “Good Taliban,” a 
policy he laid out while addressing religious scholars in April 2003.351 Specifically, 
President Karzai sought to create a wedge in the Taliban by segregating insurgents who 
were willing to talk to the new administration. To proceed with his strategy, President 
Karzai established a Peace and Reconciliation Commission under ex-president of 
Afghanistan Mr. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi as part of a peace initiative called Program 
Takhim-e-Solh (PTS).352 The commission commenced its functioning by offering 
amnesty to Taliban members who were ready to work with the new government.353 The 
commission can be regarded as a positive effort with encouraging results in the beginning 
but could not achieve conspicuous success later. Due to its inability to garner a peace 
initiative, the United States, the U.K., and the Netherlands abandoned their support for 
the initiative.354 
Reconciliation continued in one form or the other by engaging the dissident 
Taliban elements. In 2005, the Peace and Reconciliation Commission under ex-president 
of Afghanistan Mr. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi dramatically offered amnesty even to Mulla 
Omer, the Taliban chief.355 The step was retracted after strong opposition by the non-
Pashtun government leaders and the U.S.-led coalition.356 President Karzai continued 
engagement of Taliban elements mostly for political advantages and to garner the support 
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of the Pashtun population. President Karzai was not serious about the success of the 
reconciliation beyond certain domestic advantages and was not supported by the non-
Pashtun government leaders and the Coalition forces. 
Reconciliation efforts continued under Karzai but could not yield substantial 
results. In 2010, President Karzai introduced an Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program 
(APRP) aimed at engaging the low and mid-level insurgent fighter for peace and 
reintegration.357 The APRP could not yield substantial results despite heavy investment in 
terms of effort, time, and resources. The program was finally abandoned in 2016 and was 
considered a failure. It stretched over six years and cost $200 million.358 The APRP could 
admit only 11,077 insurgents by laying down their weapons, with no assurance of their 
loyalty.359  
3. Economic Development and Nation Building 
Afghanistan showed tremendous improvement in economic and infrastructural 
development as totally depleted state institutions in the post-Taliban era were developed 
by the U.S.-led coalition at great expense. The United States and the coalition countries 
invested massively in Afghanistan to rebuild the economy of a failed state.360 Due to 
heavy investments in Afghanistan, the country is all set to progress well if the security 
and political situation improves, which unfortunately is on a constant decline. The sad 
part is that Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world despite heavy 
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investments by the donor countries.361 Since the invasion of Afghanistan, its economy 
has been on a continuous rise with 9.1 percent GDP growth between 2003 to 2011.362 
The U.S.-led coalition provided extensive aid to Afghanistan. The foreign aid in 2002–
2003 was $404 million, the sum of which rose to $15.7 billion in 2010–2011.363 This 
foreign aid includes both military and civilian aid; however, it must be noted that 
expenditure in Afghanistan is much greater than expenditure on Afghanistan. Total U.S. 
spending in Afghanistan was estimated to be $444 billion in 2010/11.364 Although the 
Afghan economy improved markedly, it was heavily dependent on foreign aid. Only 
Liberia and Gaza ranked higher than Afghanistan with regards to foreign aid 
dependency.365 The bulk of the aid was security-related, but civilian aid still was 
estimated to be more than $6 billion a year.366  
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was a leading 
civilian development organization in Afghanistan. The agency was managing 
development in Afghanistan even before the U.S.-led coalition’s invasion of Afghanistan. 
Initially, USAID was slow in the development work but gained momentum after 2005.367 
USAID undertook many infrastructural development projects in the country like airport 
construction, electricity improvement, construction and upgrade of the Kajaki dam, and 
many agricultural projects in Helmand province.368  
USAID’s operations in Afghanistan, however, were greatly hampered by the 
pressures from the U.S. military to resort to “development suiting military operations.”369 
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Thus, USAID spent the majority of its budget in the southern provinces where the 
coalition forces were countering a serious insurgency by the Taliban.370 It slowed down 
USAID projects as evident from the construction of the Kajaki dam, which was started in 
2004 but could not be completed even after ten years.371 USAID had been critiqued for 
many poorly managed development projects that proved be a total failure like poor 
progress in road construction, mismanaged projects like solar panel issues, outsourcing 
companies’ problems, poorly managed agricultural projects, and staff management 
issues.372 Most of the failures of the USAID can be attributed to the pressures of the U.S. 
military to dovetail development with counter-insurgency efforts. 
Road improvement had been one of the first development projects started by the 
U.S.-led coalition but remains a failure. The coalition forces believed that the Taliban 
reigned in areas where the road ended, so road development was given due importance. 
In November 2002, the United States started rebuilding the famous ring road,373 which is 
a 3,200 kilometers loop in Afghanistan, connecting Kabul to Kandahar to Herat to 
Mazar-i-Sharif. Only the Kabul to Kandahar section of the ring road could be completed 
by the end 2003 with an extremely high cost of $190 million for a 190-mile road.374 The 
complete ring road project could not be completed despite serious efforts in terms of time 
and resources. At present, already constructed parts of the road are in deplorable 
condition and need major repairs.  
The development was also affected seriously by the role played by the CIA, 
which wanted to link development with the combat operations.375 Winning hearts and 
minds campaigns were directed only in areas where the coalition forces were facing 
resistance; thus, economic and infrastructural development aimed at overcoming the 
resistance rather than developing the areas. The U.S. military started the Commander’s 
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Emergency Response Program (CERP) to use development as a tool to improve 
security.376 Around $2 billion were allocated to CERP projects between 2004 and 2010. 
By 2011, around 16,000 quick impact projects were completed under the CERP ranging 
from $5,000 to $50,000377  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), a lower tier of the U.S.-led coalition’s 
development program in Afghanistan, could not deliver the desired results. The program 
was initially started by the United States as the Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells 
(CHLC) program and consisted of military soldiers engaged in development activity.378 
After initial success, the CHLC was expanded into PRTs with a more robust structure. 
First, PRT was established by the U.S. in the Gardez province in 2003.379 By 2008, 26 
PRTs were functioning in Afghanistan, out of which 12 were led by the U.S. and the 
remaining 14 were led by the coalition countries.380 PRTs are military heavy 
organizations with very little civilian representation, a factor which leads to their 
criticism also. In 2008, there were 1,021 military personnel serving in PRTs against 35 
civilians.381 The PRTs undertook quick action ranging from the health sector to 
agricultural and infrastructural development. Their overall performance, however, cannot 
be described as encouraging.382 Inter-agency issues and low civil and expert 
representation can be regarded as the constraining factors.383   
In a nut shell, despite heavy investments by the U.S.-led coalition, Afghanistan is 
still not stable and continues a walk on a tightrope due to political and security-related 
issues. The economic growth is ideal, but the economy is heavily dependent on foreign 
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aid, which casts serious doubts on the ability of the government to sustain the 
development in the absence of such huge foreign aid.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The invasions of Afghanistan by the Soviets and the U.S.-led coalition of over 40 
countries are 22 years apart but yet identical in many aspects. The state stabilization 
measures initiated by the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan are more or less the same as 
initiated by the Soviets in the 1980s. The sad fact is that the people of Afghanistan are 
still suffering the way they suffered in the decade of the 1980s. In this thesis, an effort 
was made to analyze the regime-stabilization efforts of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led 
coalition in Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, the thesis asked how the regime-
stabilization efforts of the Soviet Union and the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan 
compare. The thesis examined the regime/state stabilization measures of both periods of 
foreign invasion of Afghanistan in detail to discern similarities and differences. 
The regime/state stabilization efforts during both periods focused on the efforts to 
develop of institutions, such as building Afghanistan’s security forces to include the 
ANA and the ANP, political development, economic and infrastructural development, 
and, above all, pacification efforts and national reconciliation. The first effort could not 
stabilize the country, while the current effort is also far from achieving peace in the 
region. 
Security force assistance remained the hallmark of both periods of invasion. 
During the two eras, maximum importance was given to the development of the ANA 
followed by the ANP. The Afghan security forces were better placed at the time of the 
Soviets invasion and needed little assistance thereafter. Moreover, the Soviets were 
already supporting the Afghan security forces prior to their invasion of Afghanistan, a 
fact that assisted them greatly in continuing the reform process after the invasion. For the 
later effort of the SFA by the U.S.-led coalition, the situation was difficult as the security 
forces were almost nonexistent at the time of the invasion by the U.S.-led coalition. The 
Taliban forces that were in power and subsequently ousted by the U.S.-led coalition were 
not an option for incorporation into the Afghan security forces. Therefore, the solution 
was a long process of raising of new security forces.  
66 
Major Soviet efforts went in for the training and equipping of the ANA. Mostly, 
the Soviets relied on the existing strength and carried out further recruitment. Retention 
and attrition remained major drawbacks. The U.S.-led coalition’s major focus remained 
on the development of the ANA, which was considered to be a centerpiece in the effort to 
establish peace in the country. The ANA was raised from the scratch, which was a 
monumental effort. The initial lukewarm approach towards building the ANA gained 
substantial momentum after 2008 when massive funding was dedicated for the task. Like 
the Soviet period, retention and attrition had been major issues concerning the ANA.  
Development of the ANP is another highlight of the two periods. The Soviets 
raised a new police force named Sarandoy and developed it greatly for the purpose of 
maintaining law and order. The effort was enormous as the manpower of the ANP 
reached 100,000 personnel. The Soviets implemented an elaborate training mechanism 
for the ANP, but the force could not develop into a qualitative outfit. Retention and 
attrition remained major issues. The U.S.-led coalition delayed the development of the 
ANP due to the issues of involvement of diverse militaries of the coalition forces. The 
delay in the development of the ANP was later resolved by the United States allocating 
extensive funding for the effort. Despite extensive efforts by the coalition forces in terms 
of time and resources, the ANP is currently seen as a force that is still far from being 
designated as a professional police force. Retention and corruption remain major issues 
concerning the development of the ANP. 
Advisory roles by the Soviets and the U.S.-led coalition is also an aspect similar 
in both efforts in Afghanistan. The Soviets initiated a system of advisors with each unit 
and a higher echelon of the ANP and the ANA. Kobalt teams were specifically devised 
for the advisory role. The U.S.-led coalition also adopted an elaborate system of advisors 
for training and guiding the efforts of the ANP and the ANA. ETTs and PMTs are 
elaborate U.S.-led coalition’s mechanism to guide the ANA and the ANP, respectively, in 
the correct direction. Both the Soviet and the U.S.-led coalition could not achieve 
complete success through the advisory systems in place with the ANA and the ANP as 
these forces remained heavily dependent on their advisors and could not function 
independently.  
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Exhaustive efforts were initiated to stabilize the regimes of the time during both 
periods of the invasion of Afghanistan. The Soviets advocated a single-party system that 
was identical to their own political environment, while the U.S.-led coalition introduced 
the presidential form of democracy that was prevalent in the United States. Both systems 
of governance were alien to the people of Afghanistan. The Soviets endeavored to 
support the regime of the PDPA, while the U.S.-led coalition tried to support the hand-
picked Northern alliance in one way or the other. The nomination of Hamid Karzai as 
head of the interim administration and his subsequent support by the U.S.-led coalition is 
testament to this fact. The U.S.-led coalition, however, introduced plurality into the 
political system, which brought more stakeholders to the front in the system, leaving 
fewer factions to oppose the state. The Soviets’ effort was easy to implement as they 
supported an already established regime, though it was on decline. For the U.S.-led 
coalition, the task was daunting as a new presidential form of democracy was introduced 
after the toppling of a strong government of the authoritative Taliban.  
Pacification measures initiated during both periods are also largely identical. The 
Soviets tried to bring all warring factions on the platform of the PDPA. The Soviets could 
not pacify the mujahedin groups who kept fighting against the Soviets and the Afghan 
government. For the U.S.-led coalition, the Taliban have remained a distant factor. 
Although efforts were made to engage many pro-Taliban warlords, and were successful 
on many occasions, the Taliban as a force remains a reality that could not be pacified. 
The same group is now challenging the sustenance of the state of Afghanistan as a 
formidable force. Overall, the pacification measures could not achieve ultimate success in 
both periods of Afghan history. 
Infrastructural development is an aspect carried out largely by both the Soviets 
and the U.S.-led coalition to suit the military operations. The Soviets conducted 
developmental work to suit their military operations against the mujahedin. The U.S.-led 
coalition has been critiqued for dovetailing infrastructural development with combat 
operations. Nevertheless, it is evident that the infrastructural development carried out by 
the U.S.-led coalition is more elaborate and visible than the Soviets’ effort in this field. 
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Despite the efforts of both the Soviet and the U.S.-led coalitions, they could not yield 
peace in Afghanistan.   
This thesis ascertains that on a comparable battleground the stabilization 
strategies of the two rival superpowers are also identical with variation of time, duration, 
and resources. Thus, the outcome of the present effort is likely to be the same as that of 
the Soviets unless necessary remedial measures are undertaken by the U.S.-led coalition 
in Afghanistan. The thesis also concludes that the major concern in both efforts in 
Afghanistan is the failure to initiate proper pacification measures. The Soviets failed to 
pacify the mujahedin and could not reach an agreement acceptable to them, while the 
present coalition in Afghanistan has failed to pacify the Taliban and engage them in a 
mutually agreeable settlement. 
Negotiation and settlement with Taliban have connected issues for the U.S.-led 
coalition as well as the sitting Afghan government. Reaching a workable arrangement 
with the Taliban under the present Afghan constitution is a questionable equation that 
merits detailed research. Analysis of the pros and cons of negotiation with the Taliban 
and details of various options available to the U.S.-led coalition and the Afghan 
government will be highly beneficial to the policy makers in Afghanistan. This is likely 
to help in the achievement of peace not only in Afghanistan but in the entire region, 
which has seen widespread suffering from prolonged conflicts.   
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